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#1fa

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Erik van Straten<p><span class="h-card" translate="no"><a href="https://chaos.social/@fleaz" class="u-url mention" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">@<span>fleaz</span></a></span> : it's not MultiMultiFactorAuthentication but 1FA max.</p><p>Assuming that you don't use those hardware keys to generate TOTP codes (which are pointless when confronted with the likes of <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/Evilginx2" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>Evilginx2</span></a>), but use WebAuthn instead (FIDO2 passkeys in hardware keys), everything depends on one factor: the domain name of the website.</p><p>1️⃣ DV-CERTS SUCK<br>It is not very common that certificates are issued to malicious parties, but it *does* happen now and then (<a href="https://infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStraten/112914050216821746" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://</span><span class="ellipsis">infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStrat</span><span class="invisible">en/112914050216821746</span></a>).</p><p>2️⃣ SUBDOMAINS<br>Furthermore, sometimes organizations have "dangling" subdomain names. For example,</p><p> test.example.com</p><p>may point to the IP-adress of some cloud server no longer used by example.com. Anyone with write access to that server may install a fake "test.example.com" website and phish you to it. It *may* be used to phish your WebAuthm credentials *if* "example.com" does not explicitly *DENY* WebAuthn from "test.example.com".</p><p>See <a href="https://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/97#issuecomment-175766580" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://</span><span class="ellipsis">github.com/w3ctag/design-revie</span><span class="invisible">ws/issues/97#issuecomment-175766580</span></a> for how Google prevents "sites.google.com" from authenticating to "google.com".</p><p>3️⃣ DNS HACKED<br>It may not be neccessary to execute BGP-hijacks to redirect network traffic to an impostor: it also all depends on how reliable DNS records are protected against unauthorized access. If the dude in charge for DNS uses a stupid password only, or the DNS provider is easily fooled into believing "I forgot my creds", it's game over. The crooks will obtain a DV-cert in no time, no questions asked, for free.</p><p>4️⃣ All the bells and whistless are moot if there's an alternative way to log in (such as by using a 1FA rescue code) and the user is fooled into providing it (after they've been lied to that their WebAithn public key on the server became corrupted or was lost otherwise).</p><p>5️⃣ Cloudflare MitM's https connections (it's not a secret: <a href="https://blog.cloudflare.com/password-reuse-rampant-half-user-logins-compromised/" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://</span><span class="ellipsis">blog.cloudflare.com/password-r</span><span class="invisible">euse-rampant-half-user-logins-compromised/</span></a>). The same applies to any server you log in to, which is accessible by untrustworthy personnel. They can steal your session cookie.</p><p>6️⃣ In the end MFA/2FA is a hoax anyway, because the session cookie (or JWT or whatever) is 1FA anyway.</p><p>Did I mention the risks of account lockout with hardware keys that cannot be backupped? And the mess it is to keep at least one other hardware key synchronized if it's in a vault? And the limitation of, for example, 25 WebAuthn accounts max? And (unpatcheable) vulnerabilities found in hardware keys? And their price? And how easy it is to forget or loose them?</p><p><span class="h-card" translate="no"><a href="https://infosec.exchange/@odr_k4tana" class="u-url mention" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">@<span>odr_k4tana</span></a></span> </p><p><a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/1FA" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>1FA</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/2FA" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>2FA</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/MFA" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>MFA</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/JWT" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>JWT</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/SessionCookie" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>SessionCookie</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/AitM" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>AitM</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/MitM" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>MitM</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/FIDO2" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>FIDO2</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/WebAuthn" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>WebAuthn</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/Yubikey" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>Yubikey</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/Titan" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>Titan</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/BGP" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>BGP</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/DNS" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>DNS</span></a></p>